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EU	Common	Fisheries	Policy	is	bound	for	a	Brexit
shake-up
Under	the	EU’s	Common	Fisheries	Policy,	each	Member	State	decides	how	to	allocate
its	national	fishing	quota	to	its	fishing	fleet.	Griffin	Carpenter	and	Richard
Kleinjans	explain	that	many	issues	in	fisheries	policy	are	the	result	of	these	decisions
around	access	and	distribution,	and	there	are	ripe	opportunities	for	reform.
Policy	on	fishing	limits	can	be	thought	of	in	two	parts:	there	is	the	total	amount	of	fish
that	is	allowed	to	be	caught	(the	size	of	the	pie)	and	the	allocation	of	those	rights	to
fishing	vessels	(how	it	is	divided).	The	setting	of	quota	limits	attracts	much	attention,	as	fishing	ministers
negotiate	‘a	good	deal’	by	frequently	setting	quota	limits	above	scientific	advice,	a	problem	we	have	previously
analysed	on	EUROPP.	How	Member	States	determine	access	and	distribution	is	often	poorly	understood,	but	lies
at	the	heart	of	many	current	fisheries	issues.
Whether	it	is	the	disappearance	of	fishing	communities	around	the	coast,	the	controversy	over	larger	and	larger
factory	trawlers,	or	the	alarm	over	the	privatisation	of	a	public	resource,	many	of	the	concerns	about
contemporary	fisheries	management	are	about	how	the	resource	is	divided,	not	just	the	total	amount.	The
systems	in	place	vary	significantly.	For	example,	while	fishers	in	Belgium	and	the	Netherlands	fish	many	of	the
same	species	in	the	same	waters,	the	government-rationed	quotas	of	the	former,	and	market	for	ownership	rights
in	the	latter,	are	worlds	apart	in	management	approach.	These	are	designed	with	different	priorities	in	mind	and
lead	to	very	different	socio-economic	outcomes	for	the	fishing	industry,	fishing	communities,	and	wider	society.
Image
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Our	new	report,	analyses	the	systems	of	fishing	rights	in	12	EU	Member	States	(Belgium,	Denmark,	France,
Germany,	Ireland,	Italy,	the	Netherlands,	Poland,	Portugal,	Spain,	Sweden	and	the	UK)	by	providing	the	first
comprehensive	descriptive	account	of	the	systems,	evaluating	the	success	of	the	systems	in	use,	and	prescribing
policy	recommendations	for	each	Member	State.
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To	assess	whether	the	systems	of	fishing	rights	are	successful,	we	have	developed	a	framework	of	12	objectives.
These	objectives	are	based	around	ensuring	that	the	system	of	fishing	rights	is	good	for	fishers	(secure,	flexible,
accessible,	viable,	equitable	and	fair),	good	for	society	(publicly	owned,	meets	government	objectives,	limited
public	expense,	and	captures	resource	rent),	and	has	a	good	process	(transparent	and	accountable,	objective,
and	at	the	right	governance	level	and	representative).	These	12	objectives	are	considered	foundational	to	any
fishery,	while	the	objective	for	‘meets	government	objectives’	allows	for	additional	outcomes	that	are	nationally
specified	(e.g.	maintaining	coastal	employment,	maximising	output,	minimising	environmental	damage).
Figure:	Overview	of	fishing	in	12	EU	Member	States	(click	to	enlarge)
Note:	See	the	authors’	longer	report	for	more	details.
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Using	a	series	of	indicators	to	measure	each	objective,	a	ranking	is	assessed	for	each	of	the	12	objectives	across
the	12	Member	States.	Our	results	reveal	varied,	though	frequently	poor,	performance	across	the	Member	States
analysed.	As	the	table	shows,	some	conclusions	stand	out:
Most	fisheries	operate	at	a	significant	public	expense	(particularly	with	costs	of	research	and	management
as	well	as	implicit	fuel	subsidies)	with	little	revenue	generation	from	the	fishing	industry;
New	fishers	face	additional	barriers	to	entry	with	few	Member	States	implementing	measures	to
accommodate	them;
There	is	frequently	a	lack	of	transparency	and	accountability	surrounding	the	method	of	allocation	and	the
final	recipients	of	fishing	quotas;
The	financial	viability	of	fleets	is	often	mixed,	most	frequently	because	the	large-scale	fleet	is	highly
profitable	while	the	small-scale	fleet	is	unprofitable;
The	allocation	of	fishing	opportunities	often	do	not	meet	many	government	objectives,	such	as	wider	social
and	environmental	outcomes;
In	a	few	Member	States,	there	is	a	risk	of	lost	public	control	over	allocation	where	fishing	opportunities	have
been	gradually	privatised.
Fortunately,	there	are	clear	opportunities	for	improvement.	There	are	best	practices	from	some	Member	States	to
address	some	of	these	problems.	In	Denmark,	a	government-controlled	quota	reserve	is	used	to	loan	quota	to
new	fishers	and	allocate	a	portion	of	quotas	based	on	social	and	environmental	considerations.	In	France,	a
quota	reserve	is	populated	by	recovering	a	portion	of	quotas	when	vessels	are	exchanged	(along	with	their
quota).	In	Denmark	and	the	UK,	information	on	quota	ownership	is	available	in	a	public	register,	and	in	Belgium
fishers	are	directly	informed	about	the	outcomes	of	its	allocation	decisions.
There	are	also	some	bold	policy	ideas	whose	time	has	come.	A	tax	on	landed	value	would	generate	revenues	to
help	cover	management	costs,	following	from	the	fact	that	limits	on	entry	(fishing	licences)	have	generated
above-normal	profits	and	grant	a	select	group	of	fishers	exclusive	and	largely	free	access	to	the	public	resource,
all	while	requiring	public	expense	to	prevent	smooth	operation	and	the	prevention	of	overfishing.	Where	there	are
concerns	about	national	quotas	providing	little	national	benefit,	an	additional	component	would	be	to	deduct	port
fees	and	other	expenses	from	the	landings	tax,	thus	providing	an	incentive	to	land	quota	in	the	country	that	has
allocated	the	quota.
A	policy	that	could	improve	flexibility	in	quota	systems	is	an	online	peer-to-peer	exchange	where	fishers	can	swap
fishing	quotas	for	different	species	to	better	align	with	their	specification	and	sometimes	unexpected	abundance
and	scarcity	of	various	quotas.	This	is	particularly	important	as	a	ban	on	discarding	fish	is	being	phased	in	across
Europe	(i.e.	fish	can	no	longer	be	thrown	overboard	when	fishers	catch	fish	that	they	do	not	have	quota	for).
As	we	near	the	2020	deadline	for	ending	overfishing	in	the	EU’s	Common	Fisheries	Policy,	and	the	possibility	of	a
shake-up	around	Brexit,	no	doubt	focus	will	remain	on	how	much	fishing	quotas	ministers	can	secure	for	their
fleet	in	the	face	of	these	challenges.	Yet	how	Member	States	allocate	quotas	at	a	national	level	lies	behind	many
issues	in	fisheries	management,	and	despite	issues	in	performance,	there	are	available	options	for	reform.
This	article	first	appeared	on	the	EUROPP	blog	and	it	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	LSE
Brexit,	nor	of	the	London	School	of	Economics.
Griffin	Carpenter	is	an	Economic	Modeller	at	the	New	Economics	Foundation.
Richard	Kleinjans	is	an	Assistant	Researcher	at	the	New	Economics	Foundation.
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